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Summary 
The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 and the ensuing military 
intervention in Libya have been widely hailed as events of historic importance. And 
rightly so. Although the UN Security Council had authorized the use of coercive measures 
to protect civilians before, it is the first time that the Council authorized the use of force 
for the purpose of human protection against the will of the acting government of a 
functioning state. Moreover, the broad language of the resolution left room for prolonged 
military action that resulted in the toppling of the Libyan regime. The Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P), developed by the International Commission of Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) ten years ago, and endorsed, albeit in rather general terms by the 
community of states at the World Summit six years ago, is finally put into practice. This 
watershed event will change the understanding and meaning of this hitherto contested 
concept in many respects. For one thing, the events in Libya point to the continuing 
relevance of R2P. Despite the disastrous outcomes of the interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and despite plummeting support for humanitarian intervention in many 
Western societies, Resolution 1973 and the subsequent military campaign indicate that 
the idea of humanitarian intervention has not been put on the back-burner. Less easily 
predictable are the consequences of these events for the legitimacy of the concept of R2P. 
Does UNSCR 1973 indicate the emergence of a global consensus on when and how to use 
force for protective purposes? Or will these events reinforce existing normative frictions?  
This paper discusses how Resolution 1973 has been received in two relevant regional 
settings – the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) – and how 
implementation of the resolution will impact on the interpretation of R2P in both 
regional organizations. It starts with a reconstruction of R2P and discusses its application 
in Libya. The paper shows that important ambivalences in the concept of R2P, such as the 
principles of right authority and right intention, have also surfaced in the current 
controversy over the implementation of Resolution 1973. The principle of right authority 
concerns the authorization of violence as well as control over the ensuing use of force. 
The principle of right intention addresses the relationship between interests and moral 
obligations. 
In section three, the paper describes how the EU and AU have incorporated and re-
interpreted R2P in their respective security cultures. In contrast to other regional 
organizations like ASEAN, both the AU and the EU started to engage with this concept 
shortly after it had been put on the international table by the ICISS. Generally speaking, 
both organizations have reacted positively to R2P. At the same time, however, both 
organizations have adapted the concept to their local needs, traditions, and interests. The 
European Union has emphasized the preventive and reconstructive aspects of R2P at the 
cost of its protective aspects, while the AU has stressed the principle of local ownership. 
The experience in Libya will reverberate differently in both regional organizations. 
Within the EU, this event might well strengthen the hands of those actors who have long 
promoted a more forceful interpretation of R2P. Within the AU, the Libyan experience 
could lead to a disillusionment with and estrangement from this concept. Overall, the 
Libyan experience will most likely not pave the way for a broad normative consensus on 
 II 
humanitarian protection. On the contrary, it is likely to reinforce existing cleavages 
between regions and regional organizations.  
The paper concludes with an appeal to take the principle of local ownership seriously. 
It takes issue with the implicit assumption underlying mainstream European security 
writing that solving conflicts in other parts of the world through military means could 
and should be the core task of the EU’s common security and defense policy. The 
addressees of this professed charity could find the notion of Europe as a force for the good 
not generous but pretentious. Instead of making interventions in other regions its 
ordinary business, the EU should rather contribute to enabling other regional 
organizations to solve their security challenges. 
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1.  Resolution 1973 and the tension between state sovereignty and 
the global protection of human rights 
Ten years after the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) published its influential report on “The Responsibility to Protect” (ICISS 2001), 
and six years after the UN World Summit endorsed this responsibility in rather general 
terms, the ‘world community’ is acting forcefully on the basis of this contested concept. 
The military intervention in Libya, mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1973, was expressly conducted with the aim of protecting endangered civilians. 
It was not the first time that the Security Council approved enforcement measures with 
reference to the responsibility to protect.1 While Resolution 1706 invited the consent of 
the Sudanese government, in Libya R2P was enforced against the will of the host 
government, which has subsequently become the object of a campaign of regime change 
pursued by rebel forces and supported by NATO. Therefore the war in Libya will have 
lasting repercussions for how the members of the world community perceive and 
interpret the meaning of this concept. The importance of Resolution 1973 as a precedent 
was reinforced by a second military intervention on the African continent that happened 
at about the same time. On the basis of a mandate to protect civilians (UNSCR 1975), the 
UN Security Council authorized UN blue-helmets and French troops to conclude the 
power struggle in Cote D’Ivoire between the incumbent President and his elected 
successor by military means.  
Does the historic vote on 17 March 2011 on the imposition of a no-fly-zone and the 
authorization to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas” reflect the emergence of a 
new normative consensus on the legitimacy of protecting human rights through military 
means? Are we witnessing the emergence of a global consensus on the rebalancing of the 
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand and forcible human rights 
protection on the other hand?  
As impressive as the speedy 36-hour agreement on UNSCR 1973 appears, as 
premature would it be to celebrate the 10-0-5 vote on the resolution as a breakthrough on 
the path to a consensus on the legitimate use of force on behalf of endangered civilians. 
The abstention of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, as well as Germany, indicates that the 
glass is only half full. The explanations given by the BRIC countries show a variety of 
motives, not least a lack of trust in US and Western intentions regarding the use of force 
 
 
1  UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706 (31 August 2006) mentioned R2P when authorizing the 
use of force in Darfur. Other comparable cases include Res. 794 (1992), authorizing the United Task Force 
to enter Somalia and Res. 929 (1994), authorizing French troops to protect civilians during the ongoing 
genocide in Ruanda. However, while Res. 794 was taken in the absence of a central Somali government, 
Res. 929 was supported by the interim government (Bellamy/Williams 2011: 825). 
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(Jones 2011: 55).2 Even more telling was the critical attitude of the African Union 
regarding NATO’s role in implementing the resolution. On the following pages, we will 
discuss whether UNSCR 1973 does indeed represent a new consensus on R2P. We will ask 
how NATO’s intervention in Libya has been perceived by other major players and how 
this event might shape the position of relevant actors on R2P. In particular, we will 
discuss the tension between human protection and regime change, which has been part of 
the discussion on R2P since the ICISS report was published. We will look at the positions 
of two regional security organizations: the AU and the EU. Our focus on regional security 
organizations is based on three considerations. First, we acknowledge that the importance 
of regions and regional security organizations has increased significantly since the end of 
the Cold War. States increasingly turn to regional organizations as suppliers of security; 
and regional organizations increasingly shape the range of policy options that are 
available to their member states. Second, we concur with recent research which describes 
regional security organizations as important gatekeepers who frame security issues and 
formulate plausible policy responses of the world community to humanitarian crises. In 
this regard, regional security organizations are more relevant than states. They have been 
accepted by the UN as building blocks of a global peace order. Thus, they enjoy authority 
and may confer legitimacy on enforcement actions. In this regard, it has been argued that 
neither Resolution 1973 nor Resolution 1975 would have been conceivable without the 
support of the League of Arab States and the Economic Community of Western African 
States (ECOWAS), respectively (Bellamy/Williams 2011: 847). Third, we assume that 
regional security organizations function as filters between the global level, where 
emerging norms are presented, and the local level, where the compliance or non-
compliance of state actors influences their acceptability. In this sense, regional security 
organizations are an important arena where groups of states with a shared identity discuss 
their interpretation of emerging global norms. Regional security organizations (RSOs) 
may accept or reject emerging global norms. Most likely, however, they will “prune these 
norms”, i.e. they will adapt them to the existing norms, beliefs, and interests (Acharya 
2004), as expressed in basic documents and declarations of the respective organization. 
This body of basic documents, declarations, and practices which constitutes the backbone 
of the RSO and which provides directions guiding the organization’s policy and 
restricting member-states’ freedom of maneuver has been referred to as the security 
culture of an organization. Since the concept of security culture is rather fuzzy, we cannot 
contribute to the theoretical debate over its content and scope, but rather intend to use it 
as a useful shorthand device for denoting all those fundamental norms and practices 
which are at the core of an RSO’s security architecture. The security cultures of RSOs thus 
reflect and shape the local interpretations of emerging global norms. We focus on the AU 
and the EU because the regional security cultures of both organizations have been shaped 
 
 
2  In contrast, the German abstention has been interpreted differently. While some commentators point to 
domestic politics (and a dose of cynicism) (Jones 2011: 55), others refer to the special German culture of 
restraint. For a critical discussion of the German position see also Müller (2011). 
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by the popularization of the concepts of human security and civilian protection, even 
though each organization has adopted a somewhat different reading of these concepts. 
We proceed in four steps: First, we recapitulate the emergence of R2P and the 
interpretation of R2P at the global level. Second, we discuss how the AU and EU have 
received R2P at the regional levels. Third, we analyze how the AU and the EU reacted to 
NATO’s intervention in Libya, and discuss what those reactions indicate with regard to 
their future attitudes towards R2P. Although R2P has been called “a norm born out of 
Africa” (Williams 2009: 397), the way UNSCR 1973 was implemented could well lead to 
an African disenchantment with the responsibility to protect. In Europe, on the other 
hand, this episode could lead to deeper acceptance of R2P. 
2. The Responsibility to Protect: background and criteria 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a manifestation of a recent trend in international 
politics which challenges the Westphalian understanding of security, and places the 
security of individuals (instead of states) at the center of analysis. In his 1992 Agenda for 
Peace report, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali talked about “new 
dimensions of insecurity” which included “intrusion into the lives and rights of 
individuals”. He held that the “time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty […] has passed; 
its theory was never matched by reality.” Further developing this view, the 1994 UN 
Development Report introduced the concept of Human Security, criticizing that “[f]or 
too long, the concept of security has been equated with the threats to a country’s borders” 
(United Nations 1994). 
Against this background, and in response to ever-louder calls for humanitarian 
intervention in the face of atrocities committed in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
well as in reaction to the controversy triggered by NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the 
government of Canada initiated in 2000 the establishment of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). While the ICISS’s 2001 
report is usually credited for kicking off the debate over sovereignty as responsibility, it 
was in fact Sudanese national Francis Deng who introduced a broader audience to this 
notion in 1996 (Deng et al. 1996). Their concept is based on the idea of a dual social 
contract – between each government and its citizens, and between nation-states and the 
international community as a whole: “The sovereign state’s responsibility and 
accountability to both domestic and external constituencies must be affirmed as 
interconnected principles of the national and international order. Such a normative code 
is anchored in the assumption that in order to be legitimate, sovereignty must 
demonstrate responsibility” (ibid.: xvii). Hence, sovereignty should not merely be 
regarded as the right to be left alone, but as the responsibility to discharge governmental 
duties. “Normatively, to claim otherwise would be to lose sight of its purpose in the 
original context of the social contract, taking the means for the end” (ibid.: xviii). The 
authors go on to argue that if a government manifestly fails to fulfill its part of the social 
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contract, its claim to sovereign immunity becomes void. Consequently, discharging the 
responsibilities of sovereignty is in effect the best guarantee for sovereignty (ibid.: 1, 15). 
The norm entrepreneurship of Deng – coupled with the effects of state practice in the 
1990s – bore fruit when in 2001 the ICISS published its widely cited report The 
Responsibility to Protect. The gist of the ICISS’s argument is that “state sovereignty implies 
responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the 
state itself” (ibid: xi). The international community is obliged to support states to fulfill its 
responsibility by helping them to prevent conflicts and to rebuild war-torn societies after 
conflicts. R2P thus is about more than just military intervention – it actually rests on the 
three pillars: prevention, protection and rebuilding. However, if a state proves unwilling 
or unable to live up to its responsibilities, i.e. if it violates basic human rights or does not 
prevent such violations, the international community has a residual responsibility to act. 
The principle of non-intervention thus yields to the international responsibility to protect 
(ibid.: xi). This argument is derived from the idea that both the prohibition of the use of 
force and respect for basic human rights form part of international jus cogens. If a state 
violates the latter, it cannot shield itself from intervention by invoking the former. 
Borrowing from just war theory, the report listed a number of legitimacy criteria for 
interventions in “R2P situations”: Right authority, just cause (gross violations of 
fundamental human rights), right intention (putting an end to these violations), last 
resort (military means as ultima ratio, after all non-military measures have been 
exhausted), proportional means (minimal duration and intensity of military strikes), and, 
lastly, reasonable prospects of success (ibid.: xii).  
The issue of right intention in particular has emerged as a major source of 
disagreement, with Western countries time and again being suspected of ulterior motives 
when intervening abroad. Geopolitical developments post-9/11 only reinforced 
developing countries’ worries that R2P could be abused for the pursuit of the national 
interests of the powerful. At first glance, the ICISS report seems to posit a narrow scope 
for the application of R2P, which shall be neither invoked to justify the redrawing of 
borders or to support the self-determination claims of any particular belligerent party 
(ibid.: 35). The sole rationale for intervention is the protection of civilians – therefore any 
military campaign must be strictly confined to this goal, and should not be used as a 
pretext for pursuing regime change (ibid.: 35). However, the drafters of the ICISS report 
also acknowledged that the protection of civilians will often require disabling the target 
regime’s capacity for hurting its own people, “and what is necessary to achieve that 
disabling will vary from case to case” (ibid.: 35). Hence, the ICISS deliberately left some 
wiggle room for assessing the legitimacy of any military action in context-specific terms, 
avoiding an all-too rigid application of the right intention criterion. This deliberate 
indeterminacy is also reflected in the statement that while occupation of a territory could 
never be an end in itself, it could be necessary for an interim period (ibid.: 35). In order to 
operationalize the right intention criterion, the commissioners suggest the following 
indicators: Any action that is multilateral in nature, that has the clear support of the target 
population, and that is endorsed by other countries in the region satisfies the right 
intention criterion; conversely, military action that flunks one or more of these tests is less 
legitimate (ibid.: 36).  
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Another yardstick for assessing the legitimacy of an intervention is the proportionality 
principle. Here again, the ICISS used the same strategy as in the case of the principle of 
right intention: While at the outset positing strict adherence to the principle of 
proportionality, it subsequently allows for some leeway in assessing the proportionality of 
any military action in context-specific terms: “The scale, duration and intensity of the 
planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the 
humanitarian objective in question. The means have to be commensurate with the ends, 
and in line with the magnitude of the original provocation. The effect on the political 
system of the country targeted should be limited, again, to what is strictly necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the intervention. While it may be a matter for argument in 
each case what are the precise practical implications of these strictures, the principles 
involved are clear enough” (ibid.: 37). Both necessity and proportionality are elusive 
concepts which are collapsed into a single legitimacy criterion in the ICISS report, where 
the commissioners defined proportionality as the minimum necessary force for realizing 
the goal of civilian protection. Even though the ICISS claimed that “the principles are 
clear enough”, their application in practice might not be as straightforward. As has been 
argued elsewhere with regard to the use of force in counter-terrorism operations (Reinold 
2011: 267), the application of the criteria of necessity and proportionality requires an 
elusive calculation, which becomes even more complex when necessity is defined in 
“outcome-determinative” terms (Printer 2003: 343).  
The ICISS also dealt with the issue of just authority. While emphasizing the UN 
Security Council’s (UNSC) primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace, it did not duck the problem of Council paralysis and tentatively suggested 
possibilities for action outside the Council: First, states must in all cases seek Security 
Council authorization prior to carrying out any military action; second, in cases of 
massive human rights violations, the Council’s permanent members should agree not to 
use their veto power, unless vital national interests are at stake; and third, should the P-5 
exercise their veto nonetheless, recourse may be made to the General Assembly and to 
regional arrangements, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the 
Security Council (ICISS: xiif.). This reference to regional arrangements as well as the 
emerging division of labor between the UN and regional security organizations points to 
a second, less obvious subsidiary principle. If states fail in their responsibility to protect 
their citizens against gross human rights violations, the community of states will step in. 
However, the community of states might delegate this responsibility to or share it with 
concerned regional organizations. In particular, regional organizations could and should 
have a role to play in carrying out and/or monitoring the conduct of coercive action. 
Subsequently, R2P was affirmed by the major UN bodies in a variety of resolutions, 
including the World Summit Outcome Document.3 However, the World Summit framed 
 
 
3  A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005; A/RES/63/308, 14 September 2009; S/RES/1674, 28 April 2006; S/RES/ 
1706, 31 August 2006; S/RES/1856, 22 December 2008; S/RES/1857, 22 December 2008. 
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R2P in rather restrictive terms, emphasizing that intervention decisions should be taken 
on a case-by-case basis, through the Security Council, and only if national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. These conditions beg the question whether states had 
actually agreed on anything that had not been part and parcel of international law before. 
Currently, there is no inter-subjective consensus over what R2P actually means, that is, 
which rights and obligations exactly it confers or imposes upon the international 
community, and which actors are the primary duty bearers (Reinold 2010).4 The 
consequences of this opaqueness will be explored in more detail in the following. 
2.1 Protection or intervention: the case of Libya 
The crisis in Libya erupted suddenly and unexpectedly in early 2011. Whether the initial 
protests in January had been completely peaceful and whether the forces of Colonel 
Gaddafi had reacted with indiscriminate violence, including the bombing of civilian 
protesters, is still contested. In any event, the uprising quickly turned violent and the 
rebels gained control of the towns and cities in the Eastern part of the country. After these 
early successes, however, government forces regained the initiative and were about to 
conquer Benghazi, the rebel-stronghold in the East. There were clear threats by the 
Libyan government against the rebels and the city’s civilian population (Fröhlich 2011: 
143). Gaddafi had told Western reporters that measures would be taken to clear the 
country from “these cockroaches” and that “any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will 
be executed”.5 Reacting to this dire situation, the UN bureaucracy framed the crisis as a 
human rights issue, and on 23 February the UN Secretary General reminded the Libyan 
government as well as the Security Council of their responsibility to protect endangered 
civilians. UN member-states responded swiftly to this call. On 25 February, the UN 
Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the “gross and systematic 
human rights violations” and strongly calling “upon the Libyan government to meet its 
responsibility to protect its population […]”6 One day later, the UN Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1970, demanding an immediate end to the violence and establishing, 
among other measures, an arms embargo. Regional organizations reacted as well. On 22 
February, the League of Arab States suspended Libya’s membership. One day later, the 
AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) condemned “the indiscriminate and excessive use 
 
 
4  The 2008 report of the UN Secretary General on the implementation of R2P failed to clarify matters as it 
basically repeats the three components – prevention, protection and re-building – without specifying who 
bears what kind of responsibility. 
5  ABC (Australia), 23 February 2011, cited in Bellamy/Williams (2011: 838). 
6  Human Rights Council, Resolution S-15/1, Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
distributed 3 March 2011. 
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of force and lethal weapons against peaceful protesters”.7 On 7 March the Gulf 
Cooperation Council asked the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone with a view to 
protect civilians. On 8 March the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) issued a 
declaration calling upon the “Libyan authorities to immediately end the military 
operations targeting civilians […]”. The declaration stressed “the principled and firm 
position of the OIC against any form of military intervention to Libya”, but indicated that 
an emergency meeting of its executive committee might support the establishment of a 
no-fly zone.8 The same day, Secretary-General of the OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, called 
for a no-fly zone but rejected any military intervention on the ground.9 Most 
consequential, however, was the official request by the League of Arab States on 12 March 
2011 to the Security Council, asking for the establishment of a no-fly-zone. This request 
was widely regarded as a precondition for the adoption of Resolution 1973 and indeed 
tipped the balance in Washington in favor of those who had argued for the imposition of 
coercive measures. 
The bombing campaign, at first conducted by a coalition of Western states supported 
by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, began immediately after the adoption of UNSCR 
1973. On 24 March NATO was charged with the coordination and conduct of the 
enforcement measures. Initially, the air campaign focused on disabling the Libyan air 
defense and the destruction of heavy weapons of the Libyan army in the vicinity of 
embattled towns. The air strikes quickly stopped the advance of Libyan troops on the city 
of Benghazi and opened the way for the rebel forces’ counter-offensive. NATO declared 
that Operation Unified Protector would be restricted to the enforcement of UNSCR 1973 
and would be terminated as soon as the Libyan government met three demands: a) end 
attacks against civilian populated areas, b) withdraw to bases all military forces and c) 
permit unlimited humanitarian access.10 Despite these assurances, the impression quickly 
emerged that NATO was not an impartial protector of civilians, but, willingly or 
unwillingly, was pursuing the toppling of the Libyan regime. This impression was created 
by the dynamics of the conflict. A cease-fire takes two sides, and various mediating 
missions conducted by the AU, Russia and others foundered on the incompatibility of the 
party’s positions. The Transitional Council insisted on Gaddafi’s prior resignation while 
Gaddafi continued to demand that a cease-fire should have priority and would only be 
followed by a process of political reforms. Without a cease-fire, however, NATO would 
continue to pound the Libyan military. Actions by NATO and its member-states added 
heavily to this impression. Firstly, NATO extended the range of targets and attacked vital 
 
 
7  AU document PSC/PR/COMM(CCLXI) 23 February 2011. 
8  Final Declaration of OIC about Libya, 8 March 2011, www.rohama.ort/en/pages/ print.php?cid=4337 
(13.11.2011). 
9  OIC chief backs no-fly zone over Libya, emirates24/7, 8 March 2011. 
10  Compare NATO Statement on Libya, following the working lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
with non-NATO contributors to Operation Unified Protector, 14 April 2011. 
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installations of the regime like a major military compound in the center of Tripoli that 
formerly housed Gaddafi and his family. Secondly, leading NATO members made it clear 
that their political goal was the removal of Gaddafi from power. In a prominent joint op-
ed article, Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy expressed their 
commitment to the limited objectives of UNSCR 1973, but went on to argue that “it is 
impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power. […] So long as Gaddafi is 
in power, NATO and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that 
civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds” (Obama/Cameron/ 
Sarkozy 2011). Thirdly, NATO states increased their direct military support for the rebel 
forces by providing military training and purportedly also dispatching special operation 
forces. In violation of the arms embargo, France even provided weapons on an official 
basis before Russian protests stopped this practice. In brief, the boundaries between 
protecting civilians and pursuing regime change became increasingly blurred, raising 
critical questions concerning the intervening parties’ intention and the proportionality of 
the use of force. 
In the next section, we will discuss how the African Union and the European Union 
reacted to these events and how the crisis in Libya will affect their positions on R2P.  
3. The AU and R2P – from non-intervention to non-indifference? 
The creation of the African Union marked a turning point in African perspectives on 
sovereignty and (non-)intervention: Unlike its predecessor organization, which exalted 
traditional sovereignty norms, the AU Constitutive Act mandates the organization to deal 
with human rights issues in member states which are no longer regarded as matters 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states.11 The AU’s founding fathers 
equipped their organization with a far more interventionist posture than its predecessor 
organization could have ever dreamed of. However, the transition from a security culture 
characterized by the principle of non-intervention to one founded upon the doctrine of 
“non-indifference” remains incomplete.  
The Constitutive Act enshrines the fundamental norms underlying the AU’s emerging 
security culture: The principles of sovereign equality (Art. 4a), non-intervention by 
member-states (Art. 4g), non-use of force (Art. 4e, 4f, 4i), rejection of unconstitutional 
changes of government (4p), and the AU’s right to intervene in the internal affairs of 
member-states in the event of gross human rights abuses (Art. 4h). After the adoption of 
the AU Constitutive Act, African governments reaffirmed their (rhetorical) commitment 
to R2P in the “Ezulwini Consensus,” which affirmed the UNSC’s primary responsibility 
 
 
11  Art. 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act, 2158 UNTS 3 (entered into force 26 Mai 2001). 
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for the maintenance of international peace, but also noted that in certain cases regional 
organizations might have to intervene without prior Security Council approval.12 Art. 
4(h) of the AU Act as well as the Ezulwini Consensus testify to Africa’s rhetorical support 
for R2P, yet as previously noted, words have for the most part not been followed by deeds.  
A major impetus for the founding of the OAU and its successor, the AU, was the idea 
that Africa should be able to come up with African solutions to African problems in order 
to prevent foreign powers from exploiting Africa’s internal weaknesses (Selassie 1963: 
285). This notion of African emancipation from Northern tutelage is a core part of the 
AU’s emerging security culture. The AU’s nascent regional identity is constructed around 
the ideology of Pan-Africanism, which in turn is premised on the assumption that “all 
Africans have a spiritual affinity with each other and that, having suffered together in the 
past, they must march together into a new and brighter future” (Emerson 1962: 280). A 
sense of Third World identity and agency is thus asserted which was denied by the 
colonial powers and which is used as a rallying device to put up a united African front 
against Western domination.  
On this view, the creation of Africa’s security architecture is, among other things, an 
attempt to balance the hegemony of the West and has significant implications for the 
African approach to R2P. The general African tendency towards rejecting hegemonic 
interference explains for instance why various African governments tend to support the 
ICISS’s suggestion for establishing a code of conduct for the P-5 members of the UNSC in 
situations involving mass atrocities. The veto power wielded by the P-5 is anathema to 
Africans, who view the UNSC as a hegemonic body where Africans have no voice. 
Africa’s mistrust of the UNSC also explains the AU’s understanding of the relationship 
between R2P and the principle of non-intervention: While Art. 4(h) of the AU 
Constitutive Act provides for a right to humanitarian intervention and hence at first 
glance seems to reject the principle of non-interference, it is important to note that the 
right to intervene belongs to the AU, and only to the AU. In relations between Africa and 
the outside world, the non-intervention principle continues to reign supreme. Thus, 
Africa has developed a very peculiar interpretation of R2P, which includes a pruning of 
the non-intervention norm in favor of a right to intervention which is borne by the AU, 
but not the international community at large, as suggested by the ICISS. According to the 
African understanding of R2P, the primary duty-bearers are nation-states themselves; but 
if the former fail to live up to their responsibility, responsibility devolves to the AU. Prior 
authorization by the UNSC is seen as desirable, it is not, however, considered as a conditio 
sine qua non for the AU to launch a humanitarian intervention (Ladnier 2003: 53). The 
African version of R2P is obviously at odds with Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter, which lays 
down the prohibition on the use of force. Art. 103 of the Charter in turn establishes the 
primacy of the Charter over other international treaties (including the AU Constitutive 
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Act). The African R2P doctrine hence cannot be reconciled with the norms of the UN 
Charter. 
The AU’s position on R2P is also influenced by the type of security challenges facing 
its members. As Africa continues to be a continent beset by state failure, civil war, and the 
risk of mass atrocities, it seemed logical for the AU to adopt an interventionist posture. 
The genocide in Rwanda made it painfully clear to Africans that the UN could not be 
relied upon to protect African civilians. It was partially this realization which prompted 
the AU to adopt a security doctrine which is more interventionist than any other regional 
security culture in the world. 
Finally, we must look to the sub-regional level of analysis in order to understand the 
role R2P plays in the AU’s security culture. At the state level, the fear of neo-colonialism 
under the guise of humanitarian concerns continues to influence African leaders’ attitude 
towards R2P. Many African governments continue to uphold traditional sovereignty 
norms, which has frequently led to a privileging of regime security over human security. 
In addition, many African leaders share the interest in regime stability. The AU often acts 
as a mutual preservation club of autocratic leaders, who still maintain a strong sense of 
loyalty towards one another (Abdulai 2010). Hence, a genuine commitment to R2P as 
part and parcel of the African security culture is “doomed to be theoretical rather than 
practical as long as its members are primarily interested in preserving regime security and 
their exclusive access to the state’s resources” (Taylor/Williams 2008: 145). 
The AU and the crisis in Libya 
Recent developments in North Africa and the Middle East have thrown into sharp relief 
the diverging interpretations that regional organizations attach to R2P. The following 
narrative focuses on some of the most contested aspects of the debate over the military 
realization of human security, namely issues of proportionality, right intention, and 
selectivity, which emerged as major objects of controversy among the AU and the EU in 
the Libyan crisis.  
As mentioned above, a week into the carnage, the AU Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) issued a statement calling upon the Libyan government to ensure the protection of 
its citizens. The statement expressed sympathy for the aspirations of the Libyan people for 
democracy and political reform, but also highlighted the need to preserve the territorial 
integrity of Libya.13 The UNSC in turn sprang into action rather swiftly, adopting 
Resolution 1970, which referred the situation in Libya to the ICC.14 The Council’s three 
African members – South Africa, Nigeria, and Gabon – who had previously sided with 
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other African governments in frustrating the International Criminal Court (ICC) process 
in the cases of Al-Bashir and Kenya, cast an affirmative vote.  
Yet the AU did not want to leave the resolution of the crisis to extra-continental 
powers alone, and therefore adopted another statement on 10 March on the establishment 
of an ‘Ad Hoc High Level Committee’ tasked with seeking a diplomatic solution. The AU 
PSC moreover expressed its conviction that urgent African action had to be taken to 
reach a cessation of hostilities and the adoption of political reforms.15 This formula was 
seen as sufficiently flexible for leaving open the possibility of further engagement with the 
Gaddafi regime in pursuit of a diplomatic solution. When the UNSC – encouraged by the 
Arab League’s request to establish a no-fly-zone over Libya (Leiby/Mansour 2011) – 
upped the ante on 17 March by authorizing “all necessary measures” to protect civilians,16 
its African members voted in favor, even though the AU PSC had previously rejected any 
foreign military intervention.17 The onset of the bombing campaign frustrated the AU’s 
High Level Committee’s diplomatic mission, because the eminent personalities could not 
even get into the country – which further exacerbated tensions between the AU and 
NATO (Onyango-Obbo 2011). The AU’s Proposal for a Framework Agreement on a 
Political Solution to the Crisis in Libya called for an immediate and complete cessation of 
hostilities, to be followed by the formation of an inclusive transitional government, the 
establishment of a constitutional framework and the organization of elections. A peace 
plan based on this proposal, which was presented by an AU delegation under the 
leadership of Jacob Zuma to the Libyan government in April, received Gaddafi’s approval 
but failed to convince the National Transitional Council.18 Despite this failure, the AU 
continued to push for a solution to the crisis based on “the African way”, that is, through 
a negotiated settlement with Gaddafi, but was increasingly sidelined in the following 
months.  
What does the AU’s role in the crisis tell us about the organization’s commitment to 
human security and R2P? In the following, we will argue that the AU’s interpretation of 
R2P’s constituent principles such as proportionality, necessity, right intention, etc. is 
frequently at odds with the EU’s and other Western actors’ interpretation; that this 
difference is explicable with reference to the AU’s security culture; and that the AU’s 
commitment to human security is wavering when realizing human security comes at the 
expense of regime security – especially when the regime is one which has long played a 
leading role in the continental organization.  
Initially, various African leaders tried to downplay the carnage – with Zimbabwe’s 
Mugabe predictably treating the Libyan uprising as merely a “domestic hiccup” (ibid.) 
 
 
15  PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV), 10 March 2011.  
16  S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011. 
17  PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV), 10 March 2011. 
18  Libya: Gaddafi has accepted roadmap to peace, says Zuma, in: The Guardian, 11 April 2011. 
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and Uganda’s Museveni defending Gaddafi as a “true nationalist” (Museveni 2011). 
Museveni’s defense of the Libyan dictator as a “true nationalist” will sound like the purest 
form of irony to most non-Africans; yet in Africa this kind of anti-Western reasoning 
apparently continues to strike a chord with some of the continent’s autocratic and 
pseudo-democratic leaders. For a long time, many of these despots were rulers by the 
grace of Gaddafi, who generously funded their political ambitions. Unsurprisingly then, 
some of Gaddafi’s former vassals were rather reluctant to turn against their long-time 
benefactor (Kituyi 2011).  
Despite lingering sympathies towards the Libyan tyrant, in the end, however, the 
majority of African leaders were apparently convinced that “Brother Leader” Gaddafi had 
become politically untenable (Bakata 2011). This realization notwithstanding, the AU 
feared that Resolution 1973 had left too much leeway for “powerful Western states with a 
notorious track record of invasion and occupation” (D’Almeida 2011). Instead of 
supporting regime change from the outside, the AU believed that it was up to the Libyan 
people to initiate a process of political reform: “The [AU High-Level Ad Hoc] Committee 
considers that it should be left to Libyans to choose their leaders and that international 
actors should refrain from taking positions or making pronouncements that can only 
complicate the search for a solution.”19 The AU thus clearly did not think that forcible 
democracy promotion from the outside was a legitimate means to ensure the effective 
protection of civilians. NATO’s expansion of its target list to include Gaddafi’s compound 
in Tripoli, for instance, fuelled fears in Africa of hidden neo-colonial agendas (Oluka 
2011). The AU High-Level Committee therefore reminded the intervenors to strictly 
adhere to the provisions of Resolution 1973.20  
Apart from the controversy over the necessity and proportionality of military action to 
protect Libyan civilians, the criteria of right intention and non-selectivity were equally 
disputed among the various diplomatic players in the crisis. As we recall from the ICISS 
report, right intention can be measured on the basis of three indicators: Multilateral 
action, popular support, as well as the consent of other states in the region. While 
NATO’s action (at least initially) had the blessing of the UNSC as well as the Arab League, 
African leaders remained ambivalent. Even though the African members of the UNSC 
voted in favor of Resolution 1973, the AU PSC rejected foreign military intervention in 
Libya. This rejection was partly based on suspicions of double standards in the application 
of R2P and hidden agendas pursued by the West. Why, for example, did NATO intervene 
in Libya but not Yemen and Bahrain? The obvious answer, according to many African 
commentators, is that these two countries are close US allies and therefore do not have to 
fear being held accountable for their failure to protect their own peoples (Bajoria 2011; see 
also Oluka 2011). Another suspicion was that the West’s real motive for intervening in 
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Libya was not the protection of civilians, but rather to secure Libya’s vast oil supply 
(AllAfrica 2011). 
However, the AU’s own ability and willingness to act as an honest broker in the Libyan 
crisis and to apply R2P in an impartial fashion was equally doubted. In the opinion of one 
commentator, the Libyan crisis has highlighted the ambivalent commitment of many 
African governments to the notion of human security, especially when human security 
and regime security clash: “If the African Union has gone further in its Constitutive Act 
than any organization in the institutional framing of norms about the responsibility to 
protect civilians, these are still to find concrete expression in the actions of AU member 
states. As a result of its own contradictions, the AU has been lacking in political will and 
courage to deal with state-sponsored abuses of civilian right holders in member states, 
including Libya. To want to lead the mediation now is a little too late and a face-saving 
exercise for an institution without political resources and the will to solve such a complex 
impasse” (Hengari 2011). The AU High-Level Panel was criticized as an ineffective 
gathering of self-congratulatory African leaders who were ultimately forced to watch from 
the sidelines while NATO tried to bomb Gaddafi out of office (ibid.). In particular, the 
AU’s credibility to act as an impartial mediator in the conflict was called into question, 
considering Gaddafi’s central role as a prime financier of the continental organization 
(Sudane Tribune 2011). In light of the significant financial and ideological influence 
Gaddafi had wielded for so long in the OAU and later AU, it is thus rather questionable 
whether the AU itself is currently living up to the criterion of right intention in 
implementing R2P in Libya.  
Note, however, that the AU is not a monolithic bloc. Some African leaders such as 
Rwanda’s Kagame openly criticized the AU’s tepid response to the bloodshed in Libya: 
“From the African perspective there are important lessons to learn, the main one being 
that we as the African Union need to respond faster and more effectively to situations 
such as these” (Kagame 2011). Some African media commentators judged the AU even 
more harshly: “The circus of African inadequacy plays out even more glaringly in the case 
of Libya. With the exception of Rwanda and The Gambia, African states have been very 
slow in their responses to the criminal violence Col Muammar Gaddafi has visited upon 
his own people” (Kituyi 2011).  
In sum, these reactions thus show that the twin concepts of R2P and human security 
continue to be strongly contested, and that the AU’s security culture evinces a very 
peculiar understanding of these concepts. The AU’s response to the crisis was shaped on 
the one hand by the global discourse and the AU’s prior declarations on the protection of 
civilians, which is reflected in its repeated invocation of the need to protect civilians in all 
of its resolutions on the crisis. Yet if this global discourse had been the only factor, the 
AU’s response to the crisis would have been much more determined. In reality, however, 
the AU’s role is rather ambivalent, and in order to understand this ambivalence, other 
explanatory variables must be taken into account. These include regional factors such as 
the central role played by Gaddafi in the continental organization, but also the AU’s 
chronically underfunded peace and security architecture, which forced it to rely on 
diplomatic means for addressing the crisis in Libya. Third, interests and perceptions of 
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AU member-states equally played a role, such as the (historically founded) fear of African 
governments that the West might use humanitarian arguments for the pursuit of its neo-
colonial agenda, as well as the undemocratic nature of many African regimes, who tend to 
extend solidarity to their fellow autocrats and often prioritize regime security over human 
security. The predictable risk that the intervening powers would abuse their mandate to 
protect civilians and pursue the broader goal of regime change also added to the AU’s 
cautious and critical attitude. 
4. The EU and R2P – more smoke than fire? 
Since the inception of the European Security and Defense Policy at the Helsinki summit 
in 1999, a distinct European security culture with a focus on humanitarian issues has been 
emerging (Reinke de Buitrago 2010; Biava et al. 2011). This regional culture developed in 
parallel with the global debate on human security and protection. Not surprisingly, EU 
statements have expressed support for R2P on several occasions.21 Referring to well-
established concepts of the EU as a normative power (Manners 2002; Haukkala 2008), a 
standard interpretation is that the EU welcomes the emerging R2P norm because it has 
initiated this norm in the first place. Such an interpretation, however, would be 
misleading. The story of the inter-relationship between global and European norm 
development is much more complex than it appears at first glance. In fact, the EU is as 
much a taker of global norms as it is a promoter of European norms. 
On the following pages, we will reconstruct the co-evolution of the global protection 
norm and European security culture. We will begin by showing that the interpretations of 
the global norm and the emerging European security culture are interrelated and have 
both been contested. The body of EU doctrines and practices that had emerged before the 
Libyan crisis reflects a restricted interpretation of the human security/R2P agenda. The 
EU had been focusing on conflict prevention and peace-building and the idea of military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes, by contrast, was much less entrenched in the 
emerging European security culture. Secondly, we will show that this adaption of 
emerging global norms to local circumstances cannot fully be explained with reference to 
the interests of (powerful) EU states, but also reflects the institutional structure and 
dynamics of the EU. These findings will be developed in three steps: first, a brief 
reconstruction of the development and meaning of European security culture and how 
this development related to the interpretation of the responsibility to protect; second, an 
analysis of the drivers and mechanisms of pruning; and finally, a focus on EU practices. 
The origins of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) can be traced back to an 
agreement between Britain and France on the need for Europe to possess real military 
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power. While alliance politics was one motive behind this drive for European military 
capabilities (Howorth 2007: 52-54), ethics was the other. The Labour government, having 
proclaimed an ‘ethical foreign policy’, conceived of ESDP as a “force multiplier” for 
humanitarian interventions (Williams 2005: 164-177). Following the catastrophe in 
Rwanda, France had also witnessed a lively debate on humanitarian interventions and, 
renouncing Gaullist traditions, sought a multilateral cover for future military missions 
(Treacher 2003).  
Early European doctrines reflect this consensus by setting the ambitious Helsinki 
Headline Goal (HHG) of enabling Europe to field a 60.000 strong, well equipped and 
highly mobile intervention force (Schmitt 2004: 110f.) that would be able to fight wars like 
the ones in Bosnia or Kosovo (Howorth 2007: 104f.; Giegerich 2008: 17). In the following 
years, however, European security culture developed in a different direction. The EU, for 
all practical terms, abandoned its high-flying military plans and instead focused on the 
creation of civilian and integrated civil-military instruments of conflict prevention and 
peace-building (Nowak 2006: 20-23; Menon/Sedelmeier 2010). This redirection went 
hand-in-hand with a redefinition of European security culture. Instead of focusing on 
peace enforcement tasks, European security documents increasingly stressed the root 
causes of violence and emphasized conflict prevention, structural peace-building, and the 
nexus between development and peace.22 Working with the UN and other regional 
security organizations has become another hallmark of European security culture (Tardy 
2005). EU documents like the 2003 European Security Strategy stress the principle of 
multilateralism and promise to contribute with civilian and military capabilities to UN 
peace-keeping efforts.23  
Despite these conceptual and institutional linkages between the European regional 
system and the UN, the terms “human security” and “responsibility to protect” begin to 
appear in EU documents only after the decision of the World Summit in September 2005. 
A reference to R2P appears for the first time in the Consensus on Development 
(November 2005). Reiterating the statement of the EU-Presidency at the World Summit, 
the document states that "the EU also strongly supports the responsibility to protect. We 
cannot stand by, as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other gross violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights are committed”.24 The 2008 Report on 
 
 
22  The 2005 European Consensus on Development, for example, states that “(the Community) will maintain 
its support to conflict prevention […] and peace building by addressing the root-causes of violent 
conflicts, including poverty, degradation, exploitation […]” European Parliament, Council, Commission 
2006: The European Consensus on Development, Official Journal (C46/01), 24.2.2006. 
23  A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels 2003. Compare also: EU 
Commission (2003); European Council (2004) 
24  European Parliament, Council, Commission 2006: The European Consensus on Development, Official 
Journal (C46/01), 24.2.2006 (Article 37). A similar remark can be found in the EU Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid, see: Council of the European Union (2008): The European Consensus on 
Humanitarian Aid 2008/C25/01, Brussels. 
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the Implementation of the ESS created a closer link between European security and the 
human security/R2P agenda. The report states, “Sovereign governments must take 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity” (Council of the European Union 2008: 2).  
The picture that emerges from these rare remarks and from the corpus of ESDP 
documents shows that the EU has developed a peculiar understanding of the human 
security/R2P agenda that is more akin to the restricted understanding of the World 
Summit than the broader understanding of the ICISS. To start with, the EU clearly 
subscribed to an interpretation that emphasizes the responsibility to prevent and to 
rebuild, and downplays the responsibility to protect with military means. EU documents 
clearly convey the understanding that force should be used in rare and clearly defined 
circumstances only. Coercive measures are consistently mentioned in connection with 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. Concerning right 
authority, the EU clearly respects the prerogatives of the UN Security Council. Many 
ESDP documents state that “the Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the UN 
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security”, consciously 
leaving room for ambivalence. In contrast, EU documents containing a reference to the 
R2P emphasize the authority of the Council in stricter terms, demanding that 
enforcement measures should be taken “through the Security Council or approved by the 
Security Council”.25 Lastly, EU documents clearly indicate that local actors bear the prime 
responsibility to protect. If states prove unable or unwilling to protect their population, 
this responsibility would then pass over either to the UN or to the geographically 
responsible regional security organization. Outside of Europe, the EU sees itself primarily 
in an auxiliary role. It will empower local actors or, if absolutely necessary, step in 
temporarily to fill the gap before local actors or the UN take over (Gänzle/Grimm 2010; 
Brosig 2011).  
In the following section, we show how regional dynamics influenced the reception of 
the emerging global protection norms on the European level. States remain important 
actors in European security policy. While all EU states showed support for the protection 
of human rights in general,26 they differed with regard to the issue of military protection. 
On one end of the spectrum sat countries whose colonial histories accustomed them to 
interventionist practices – namely France and the UK, who consistently supported both a 
militarily meaningful ESDP and an interventionist interpretation of R2P. The National 
Security Strategy of the United Kingdom refers affirmatively to the R2P, as does the 2008 
French White Paper on Defense and National Security. Former French Foreign Minister 
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Bernard Kouchner in particular promoted a rather extensive understanding of R2P. 
During the floods in Burma, he even argued that “aid might have to be imposed if the 
military regime refused to cooperate.”27 On the other end of the spectrum were member-
states with a neutral or non-interventionist tradition like Germany. They emphasize the 
preventive and peace-building aspects of both ESDP and the global protection norms. 
Many of the new member-states are still preoccupied with traditional security concerns 
and de-emphasize the global humanitarian agenda of European security. 
Input on the European security debate came from above and below, and was shaped 
by regional factors, most notably the institutional structure of the EU. In contrast to 
intergovernmental reasoning, the large and powerful states did not dominate the 
outcome. Instead, institutional mechanisms, especially the agenda-setting powers vested 
in the rotating Presidency, increased the number of opportunities for smaller states to 
assert their opinions. Sweden, in the first semester of 2001, became the first to use its EU-
Presidency to push the emerging European security culture away from the British and 
French interventionist vision. The Gothenburg Summit in June 2001 adopted the seminal 
“EU Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” which laid the foundation for the 
civilian dimensions of ESDP. Successive Presidencies of countries with a similar outlook 
built on these lines. To defend their vision of ESDP, they, too, referred to global norms 
but emphasized their soft security aspects. Finland, for example, reconvened the 
Barcelona Group of eminent thinkers and NGOs to advance a preventive interpretation of 
the human security agenda within the EU. Of course, France and the UK also used the 
institution of the Presidency to further their views. It is no coincidence that the strong EU 
support for R2P at the World Summit was presented by Tony Blair, who served as EU 
President during the second semester of 2005. France used its Presidency in the second 
semester of 2008 to write an explicit reference to R2P into the 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS. However, given the vast majority of small states with a neutral 
and non-interventionist tradition, the institution of the rotating presidency contributed to 
the re-orientation of European security culture. 
International bureaucracies, too, pushed European security culture away from the 
early British/French conception. Although the primary responsibility for security rests 
with the second pillar, the Commission established itself as a major player in this field. In 
fact, its activities date back to a 1996 planning paper by Directory General Development 
on conflict prevention in Africa.28 The Commission’s views were captured by Joao de 
Deus Pinheiro (1999), then Commissioner for Development, when he stressed three 
principles of the EU approach: local ownership; a long term approach that focuses on root 
causes of conflicts, and the integration of different instruments to work on all phases of 
 
 
27  See the article ‘To protect sovereignty, or to protect lives?’, in: The Economist, 15 May 2008, online at 
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the conflict cycle. On several occasions, the Commission referred to UN norms and 
practices in order to legitimize its own policy. For instance, the 2001 Communication on 
Conflict Prevention states clearly that: “The Commission is closely following the 
implementation of the Brahimi Report and fully subscribes to the peace-building 
approach set out in the Report. In proposing the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (a new 
funding line, M.D./T.R.), the Commission drew inspiration from the UNSG’s proposals 
on establishing quick impact projects for countries emerging from crisis”.29 However, the 
Commission portrayed the human security/R2P agenda in a way that fit its own 
approaches and bureaucratic interests. For example, External Relations Commissioner 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated that the UN’s “holistic approach echoes the EU’s own 
commitment to a comprehensive conception of security” (Biscop 2005: 75). In a 2006 
speech, she noted that the 2005 World Summit had recognized that “development, 
security and human rights are inextricably interlinked.” She welcomed the notion of 
human security and defined it as “the comprehensive security of people […] 
encompassing both freedom from fear and freedom from want”.30 In general, members of 
the Commission have expressed the view that the greatest potential for operationalizing 
R2P at the EU level is in terms of prevention, where the EU already has a range of 
instruments at its disposal such as development cooperation, trade or human rights and 
environmental policies (Vincent/Wouters 2008: 9).  
Javier Solana, the EU’s first High Representative, influenced the direction of the 
emerging European security culture as well. He was not only ex officio the author of the 
above mentioned Security Strategy and other key documents, but also used his personal 
standing to steer the development of ESDP, such as when he initiated the Barcelona Study 
Group of independent experts. The group, under the leadership of Mary Kaldor, was 
encouraged by Solana to draft a vision of European security that combined an 
interventionist agenda with the specific institutional strength of the EU in the field of 
civilian and civil-military prevention and long-term peace-building. Referring to global 
norms, the group proposed a ‘Human Security Doctrine for Europe’, but presented the 
concept in a particular way:31 They stated that the EU should defend the security of 
human beings, if necessary by military means, and went on to argue that Europe’s 
military intervention forces should be configured in new ways that would enable them to 
address the security needs of people. The study group thus proposed a human security 
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intervention force, composed of civilian reconstruction specialists, police, and troops 
trained and equipped to protect endangered populations, not to win wars.32  
Among the EU institutions, the European Parliament (EP) has been the most 
outspoken advocate of humanitarian protection and strongly supported ESDP’s stressing 
both R2P and the notion of human security, as defined by the Barcelona Group33 
However, even in the EP consensus on R2P remains fragile. Reservations are expressed by 
parts of the European Peoples Party and the Confederal Group of the European United 
Left who fear that the R2P agenda might be used to justify military interventions 
(Vincent/Wouters 2008: 8). The strength of the EP’s support for the R2P agenda 
contrasts, however, with Parliament’s rather limited influence on decision-making in the 
second pillar.  
On the next pages, we ask whether and to what extent the doctrinal fit between the 
R2P agenda and evolving European security culture guides European policy practices. 
Does the EU move beyond declaratory policy to action? And what kind of action does the 
EU take to protect endangered populations abroad? Firstly, we find that since the 
inception of ESDP, the EU has become one of the most important providers of soft 
humanitarian security. Using CFSP and community instruments, the EU has supported 
and conducted numerous activities in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building. 
The bulk of these programs have been executed in cooperation with the UN or with other 
regional security organizations, most notably the African Union (Brosig 2011). To a 
surprisingly high degree, the EU has financed UN programs or institutions like the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission (Miall 2007) and activities of other RSOs without involving 
itself in the implementation of these programs. For example, 48% of the funds from the 
Instrument of Stability, through which approximately 300 million Euros are disbursed 
every year, have been implemented by UN agencies and 17% were channeled through 
other RSOs (Natorski 2011). Another example is the African Peace Facility, established by 
the EU in 2004, whose funds may be used to defray expenses incurred by African 
countries deploying their peacekeeping forces in other African countries (Pirozzi 2009: 
25).  
A similar picture emerges with regard to the ESDP missions. Since the beginning of 
ESDP, the EU has conducted more than 20 civilian and military operations in different 
parts of the world, with Africa and the Balkans being the focal points. The EU conducted 
most of the operations in Africa in close cooperation with either the UN or the AU 
(Brosig 2011: 109; Biava et al. 2011: 45). Although most EU operations are executed by 
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coalitions of the willing in many cases with France as lead-nation – the character of 
missions is nevertheless heavily influenced by European practices and institutional 
constraints. Operations are usually short-term, have a clear exit-option and involve only 
limited resources and risks. These constraints reflect the limited willingness of European 
states to engage themselves in humanitarian protection operations. The emerging 
European security culture has had a pulling effect. For example, the moral authority of the 
UN as well as EU peer pressure induced Germany, much against its instincts and 
traditions, to take part in the 2006 mission to Kinshasa/Congo, aimed at providing 
stability during the strained election process (Gowan 2009: 120). However, at other 
instances, this mechanism proved to be less effective. For example, Germany refused to 
participate in the EU mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR-
CHAD/CAR). And when the UN, facing an imminent humanitarian crisis in the Eastern 
Congolese province of Kivu, requested help in October 2008, EU member states decided 
simply not to respond (Pirozzi/Sandawi 2009: 14).  
The EU and the crisis in Libya 
The humanitarian crisis in Libya puts a spotlight on deep divisions within Europe on the 
meaning of European security culture and the R2P. During the early phase of the crisis 
and before the use of force was seriously contemplated, the EU-states seemed to act 
according to the same tune. After Italy, which initially blamed the insurgents for the 
crisis, joined the European chorus, an agreement emerged that the actions of the Libyan 
government constituted grave violations of human rights and that Colonel Gaddafi must 
relinquish power.34 During these days, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle projected 
an image as a promoter of tough measures, declaring “the time of appeals is over. Now is 
the time for action. Germany will take the lead while some other EU-members have been 
hesitant”.35 This was a major turn away from the previous EU policy of engagement, 
which aimed at accommodating Libya into the respected group of Neighborhood 
Countries following the lifting of sanctions in 2004. As recently as October 2010 High 
Representative Catherine Ashton had attempted to arrange a cooperation agreement 
worth 50 million Euros with Libya on border security and the “management” of 
migration flows. On 28 February 2011 and following UNSC Resolution 1970, the EU 
imposed an arms embargo and additional sanctions. A special European Council meeting 
on 11 March condemned the “gross and systematic violation of human rights” – a phrase 
that has been reiterated in several EU-documents since then. The Council declared that 
“Colonel Kadhafi must relinquish power immediately” and welcomed “the referral of the 
situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court […]” (European Council 2011: 2f.) 
 
 
34  See the 20 February statement by HR Ashton: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
PESC/11/33&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (17.11.2011). 
35  FAZ, 26 February 2011, p. 4. 
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Despite the rhetorical condemnation, the EU has been heavily criticized for its failed 
policy vis-à-vis Libya and its slow reaction to the unfolding crisis. Comments castigated 
the EU for its ineffective European Neighborhood Policy that put EU (energy) interests 
first and paid lip-service to European values, for its flawed arms export policy that did 
almost nothing to stop dubious shipments of dangerous arms to Libya, and for its human 
rights policy that allowed member-states to conduct dubious deals with the Libyan leader 
in order to keep unwanted immigrants away from European shores (Friedensgutachten 
2011: 13f.).  
The image of the EU as driven by events instead of driving them changed when 
President Sarkozy regained the initiative. Supported by British PM David Cameron, as 
well as representatives from smaller EU states, he began to compare the situation in Libya 
with the events in Srebrenica and Rwanda. Faced with the Gaddafi’s threats of revenge 
should Benghazi, the rebel stronghold, fall, Sarkozy decided to unilaterally recognize the 
Transitional National Council on 9 March 2011 and, together with the UK, prepared the 
groundwork for UNSC Resolution 1973. In contrast, German representatives were careful 
not to use vocabulary that might invoke the responsibility to protect. As the possibility of 
an intervention drew closer, German representatives continued to express deep 
reservations about the use of force. Given this disagreement, the only additional measure 
the EU could agree on was the extension of financial sanctions. The vote on UNSC 
resolution 1973, authorizing member states to take all necessary measures to protect 
civilian and populated areas, revealed a deep division. While three EU members of the 
Security Council voted in favor, the forth – Germany – abstained. This publicly displayed 
disunity over a vital conflict in Europe’s direct vicinity amounts to a disintegration of 
Europe as a political actor. As one diplomat puts it: ‘CFSP died in Libya – we just have to 
pick a sand dune under which we can bury it’ (Menon 2011: 76). In the aftermath of this 
diplomatic disaster, the EU tried to overcome the split by adopting on 1 April a decision 
on an EU military operation in “support of humanitarian assistance operations”. EUFOR 
Libya could be launched if requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA, however, deemed this offer not helpful, adding to 
the European embarrassment. 
The justice criteria developed by the ICISS played some role in European discussions. 
Right authority was an issue but, due to the swift adoption of Resolution 1973, did not 
figure prominently. Before the adoption of Resolution 1973, some voices demanded the 
use of force even without Security Council approval (Peral 2011). Official French and 
British statements, however, stressed the necessity of proper authorization as a 
prerequisite for military action. The Arab League’s demand for a no-fly-zone, too, was 
regarded as crucial, as was the participation of two Arab states in the Western coalition. 
Issues of right intention were discussed, but again were not decisive. Noting the striking 
discrepancy between the French attitude before and after the Arab uprising, 
commentators suspected that Sarkozy’s efforts during the crisis were motivated by 
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attempts to distract attention from the coziness that had developed between members of 
the French government and North African dictators before the crisis.36 More important, 
and we will return to this point later in the paper, was the discrepancy between the 
officially declared EU goal of removing the Gaddafi regime from power and the mandate 
of Resolution 1973 to protect civilians. Some commentators insinuated that protecting 
civilians was just a pretext for ulterior aims (Mutz 2011: 56).37 This suspicion is probably 
not unfounded, for example: the Italian reversal of policy was likely motivated by the fear 
that Italian influence in Libya would wane if the French-backed opposition forces 
prevailed and Italy was still perceived as an ally of the old regime. Others pointed out that 
in cases where regimes commit severe crimes against their population, protecting civilians 
will inevitably raise the issue of regime change. Issues of proportionality were also noted 
and discussed in Europe. While some critics questioned the legitimacy of bombing 
governmental complexes in Tripoli, others demanded an intensification of the bombing 
campaign as well as the temporary employment of ground troops to relieve the situation 
in Misrata (de Vasconcelos 2011). Another relevant debate concerned the issue of 
reasonable prospect of success. Critics asked whether it was reasonable to assume that 
bombing Gaddafi’s forces would end the humanitarian distress or whether NATO’s 
intervention would more likely lead to a protracted civil war (Pradetto 2011; 
Friedensgutachten 2011: 5). Other voices questioned the moral integrity of the resistance 
forces and expressed concerns that the victory of the resistance movement might lead to 
the same acts of revenge that NATO tried to prevent in the first place. In essence, these 
debates reflected deeper splits in Europe between countries with an interventionist 
tradition like France and the UK and non-interventionist countries like Germany. 
In sum, the Libyan crisis exposed deep ambivalences within Europe. Europeans, in 
general, support the emerging global protection norms as they reflect basic European and 
EU norms on human rights and individual freedoms. However, they disagree on the 
consequences of R2P for European security culture and thus struggle over the exact 
meaning of these norms. While all European actors refer to global norms to legitimize 
their positions, they emphasize those aspects of the global human security/R2P agenda 
that reflect their own traditions, outlooks and interests. While the exact meaning of 
European security culture is still contested, Europeans collectively tend to emphasize the 
dimensions of prevention and re-building at the expense of military protection, because 
the coercive use of military force is still controversial.  
 
 
36  Even after violence had erupted Libya in after the ‘day of wrath’ on 18 February 2011, former French 
Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie continued to call for a ‘stabilizing role’ of the EU (Andreas Rinke 
2011: Eingreifen oder nicht? Warum sich die Bundesregierung in der Libyen-Frage enthielt, in: IP 66: 4, 
44-52 (45). 
37  Mutz, Reinhard 2011: Libyen: Lizenz zum Töten? In Blätter für deutsche und Internationale Politik, 56: 6, 
53-56. 
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5. Conclusion 
The responsibility to protect has become an integral part of both the African and the 
European security cultures. Despite some similarities, however, both organizations also 
display certain peculiarities in their respective interpretations of R2P. Core documents of 
the AU acknowledge the protective aspects of R2P but emphasize that decisions on 
enforcement measures on the African continent should be taken by Africans. This 
attitude reflects deep-seated fears of exploitation and domination by outside powers. At 
the same time, there is a marked discrepancy between rhetorical support for the 
enforcement aspects of R2P on the one hand, and the political reservation of many 
authoritarian leaders in Africa who fear that any infringement on the principle of 
sovereignty might threaten their political survival on the other hand. The EU in turn has 
emphasized the preventive side of R2P at the expense of its enforcement aspects. This 
ambivalence reflects on the one hand a wavering European commitment to assuming 
responsibility for the protection of civilians globally and on the other hand exposes deep 
rifts among EU member states on issues pertaining to the use of force. 
The civil war in Libya and NATO’s bombing campaign were perceived rather 
differently in both world regions and will probably have lasting, but diverging, effects on 
the development of each region’s security culture. Although many observers in Europe 
note the marked contrast between the attitudes of many European states towards the 
Libyan regime before and after the eruption of violence, they nevertheless deem the 
intervention justified and think that the primary aim of the intervening states has indeed 
been the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe. The debate furthermore reveals the 
isolation of Germany. While many Eastern European members had deep reservations as 
well, their reticence drew less criticism than Germany’s. More importantly, since the vote 
on UNSCR 1973 and the military successes of the rebels, Germany has been on the 
defense. Berlin has for all practical purposes been excluded from the deliberations over 
Libya’s political future. In order to realign itself with the Western European consensus, 
the German government has taken a couple of symbolic steps. In a sense, this might 
indicate a certain acceptance of the German government that it had acted in contradiction 
to the European spirit. Berlin was even ready to participate in the planned EUFOR Libya 
mission, originally devised as a humanitarian mission that would have put boots on the 
ground in a dangerous and hostile environment. The indirect recognition that it is not in 
accordance with “European” norms to prevent the use of protective force in the event of 
an ongoing humanitarian disaster might have a lasting effect on how the EU localizes 
emerging global norms on humanitarian protection. Since nothing is as convincing as 
success, the successful practice of applying force for the protection of civilians in Libya 
will have a lasting effect on the emerging European security culture. Indeed, recent official 
statements by EU representatives already reflect an emerging consensus on the use of 
military force. For example, the President of the European Council, Herman Van 
Rumpoy, in a keynote address to the UN General Assembly, concluded that when “there 
was the risk of a bloodbath in Benghazi, European leaders […] acted with swiftness and 
determination, diplomatically and militarily. […] The principle of “responsibility to 
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protect” was put into action – with perseverance and success.”38 Last, but not least, events 
in Libya have exposed the weaknesses and moral deficits of the traditional European 
policy of engagement. Until the Arabian rebellions, EU policy vis-à-vis its neighborhood 
was characterized by an implicit recognition that authoritarian regimes are a fact of life: 
the EU must engage with them for the sake of preserving order and stability rather than 
opposing them in the name of freedom and justice. After Libya, the pendulum might 
swing back and human rights and justice issues might move to the center of the EU’s 
security policy.  
Reactions in Africa will probably be more ambivalent. On the one hand, some 
decision-makers and many civil society voices have deplored the continuing weakness of 
the AU in the face of massive human rights abuses on the African continent. These voices 
will probably demand that the AU take an unequivocal stand on R2P in the future and 
that the organization improve its capacity to solve African problems. On the other hand, 
many decision-makers and other public voices show deep resentment vis-à-vis the West. 
They believe that NATO unilaterally reinterpreted the UN mandate to achieve its ulterior 
motives. Instead of protecting civilians, NATO misused the mandate to orchestrate 
regime change in Libya. What is more, NATO’s intervention also stymied the AU’s 
mediating efforts which might have led to a political power-sharing arrangement. The AU 
promised to come up with African solutions to African problems, thus allowing Africans 
to accept global norms on human protection without having to fear outside intervention. 
Libya has proved the hollowness of this promise.39 Overall, the long-term effects of 
NATO’s intervention will probably prove more divisive than the vote on UNSCR 1973 
suggested and many Western observers believe. To prevent a lasting African 
disenchantment with R2P, Western states, instead of marginalizing the AU, should 
engage the organization and accept it as a legitimate player in the solution of 
humanitarian crises. Most importantly, NATO should ask the AU to take an active role in 
helping the people of Libya to rebuild the political institutions of the country. Even if the 
participation of another international organization might come at the price of a certain 
loss of efficiency, this price would be small in comparison to the gains in legitimacy. 
Participation of the AU would at least help to mitigate African misgivings about Western 
involvement in Africa and could contribute to strengthening Africa’s commitment not 
only to the responsibility to react, but also the responsibility to rebuild.  
Finally, the intervention in Libya brought several controversial dimensions of the 
concept of R2P to the fore, which needs to be addressed before this concept will gain 
 
 
38  Address by Herman Van Rumpoy, 66th United Nations General Assembly General Debate, New York 22 
September 2011, EUCO 78/11. 
39  See, for example, Thabo Mbeki‘s op-ed article in “Die Zeit” (9.6.2011) in which he deplores that Western 
powers have used their supremacy in the UN Security Council to decide on the fate of African countries – 
without taking into account or even listening to what the Africans themselves have to say. “This is the 
same attitude as Westerners displayed during colonial times when they presided over our continent.” See: 
www.zeit.de/2011/24/p-oped-Afrika/komplettansicht (15.6.2011). 
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general acceptance. One structural dilemma concerns the collection and assessment of 
evidence for the perpetration of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. If the world community waits until unambiguous evidence for these crimes is 
available, it will in many cases be too late to intervene. On the other hand, intervention on 
the basis of vague evidence would create doubts concerning the observance of the right 
intention and proportionality criteria. In the end, the decision on whether and when to 
intervene will depend on the assessment of the Security Council. However, the creation of 
a UN fact-finding instrument could improve the quality of this assessment and might 
reduce disagreements among members of the world community. 
Another important issue concerns the tension between the protection of civilians and 
the rights of sitting governments. As we have pointed out, the ICISS report argued that 
the sole rationale for intervention should be the protection of civilians and that force 
should not be used to pursue regime change. However, the drafters of the report also left 
some room for interpretation as they acknowledged that in some cases the protection of 
civilians might require the disabling of the host regime’s instruments for committing 
atrocity crimes against its own people. In most cases, the fine line between protection and 
regime change will be determined by context specific factors. The Libya experience 
suggests two lessons: Firstly, the emphasis of the 2005 World Summit document on 
helping states to fulfill their responsibility to protect strongly supports the conclusion that 
R2P also includes respect for state sovereignty. In many cases, this demands a 
responsibility on behalf of intervening actors to work actively for a compromise between 
governments and suppressed/rebelling parts of society. In the case of Libya, NATO did 
not participate in the search for a negotiated solution. Quite to the contrary, the Alliance 
even undermined a negotiated solution by insisting that Gaddafi must go and supporting 
at least indirectly the uncompromising position of the Transitional Council. Second, ex 
ante authorization in form of a Security Council mandate will in many cases prove 
insufficient to delineate legitimate protective measures from illegitimate regime change. 
In the case of Libya, the intervening states clearly overstepped the UNSC mandate, for 
example by delivering weapons to the rebels, inevitably raising doubts about the purity of 
their intention. To prevent a free-wheeling interpretation of mandates in future cases, an 
oversight mechanism should be introduced which would allow the Security Council in its 
entirety to oversee the implementation of protective mandates. 
Lastly, Libya raises the issue of who should carry the burden of protection. As long as 
this duty rests on coalitions of willing states, there will inevitably be suspicion that 
intervention decisions are driven by ulterior motives rather than moral concerns. Even 
worse, if Western states were the only actors able and willing to conduct humanitarian 
interventions in non-Western regions, suspicion would increase and would undermine a 
global consensus on the responsibility to protect. In this regard, the basic idea of ESDP as 
an instrument for interventions outside of Europe is highly problematic. Empowering 
other regional organizations like the African Union to solve local problems is thus a more 
important and rewarding task of European security.  
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